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Abstract	  –	  In	  my	  article	  The	  genetical	  theory	  of	  multilevel	  selection,	  I	  provided	  a	  8	   synthesis	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  multilevel	  selection	  (MLS)	  and	  the	  theory	  of	  natural	  9	   selection	  in	  class-­‐structured	  populations.	  I	  framed	  this	  synthesis	  within	  Fisher’s	  10	   genetical	  paradigm,	  taking	  a	  strictly	  genetical	  approach	  to	  traits	  and	  fitness.	  I	  11	   showed	  that	  this	  resolves	  a	  number	  of	  longstanding	  conceptual	  problems	  that	  12	   have	  plagued	  the	  MLS	  literature,	  including	  the	  issues	  of	  “aggregate”	  versus	  13	   “emergent”	  group	  traits,	  “collective-­‐fitness1”	  versus	  “collective-­‐fitness2”	  and	  14	   “MLS1”	  versus	  “MLS2”.	  In	  his	  commentary,	  Goodnight	  suggests	  this	  theoretical	  15	   and	  conceptual	  synthesis	  is	  flawed	  in	  several	  respects.	  Here,	  I	  show	  this	  is	  16	   incorrect,	  by:	  reiterating	  the	  theoretical	  and	  conceptual	  goals	  of	  my	  synthesis;	  17	   clarifying	  that	  my	  genetical	  approach	  to	  traits	  is	  necessary	  for	  a	  proper	  analysis	  18	   of	  the	  action	  of	  MLS	  independently	  of	  non-­‐Darwinian	  factors;	  emphasising	  that	  19	   the	  Price-­‐Hamilton	  approach	  to	  MLS	  is	  consistent,	  useful	  and	  conceptually	  20	   superior;	  and	  explaining	  the	  role	  of	  reproductive	  value	  in	  the	  study	  of	  natural	  21	   selection	  in	  class-­‐structured	  populations.	  	  22	   	  23	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Introduction	  26	  
	  27	   In	  my	  article	  The	  genetical	  theory	  of	  multilevel	  selection	  (Gardner	  2015),	  I	  28	   provided	  a	  synthesis	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  multilevel	  selection	  (MLS)	  and	  the	  theory	  of	  29	   natural	  selection	  in	  class-­‐structured	  populations.	  I	  framed	  this	  synthesis	  within	  30	   Fisher’s	  (1918,	  1930,	  1941)	  genetical	  paradigm,	  taking	  a	  strictly	  genetical	  31	   approach	  to	  traits	  and	  fitness.	  I	  showed	  that	  this	  resolves	  a	  number	  of	  32	   longstanding	  conceptual	  problems	  that	  have	  plagued	  the	  MLS	  literature,	  33	   including	  the	  issues	  of	  “aggregate”	  versus	  “emergent”	  group	  traits,	  “collective-­‐34	   fitness1”	  versus	  “collective-­‐fitness2”	  and	  “MLS1”	  versus	  “MLS2”	  (reviewed	  by	  35	   Okasha	  2006).	  36	   	  37	   Goodnight	  (2015)	  suggests	  this	  theoretical	  and	  conceptual	  synthesis	  is	  flawed	  in	  38	   several	  respects.	  He	  suggests	  that	  I	  did	  not	  adequately	  review	  the	  empirical	  39	   literature	  on	  MLS,	  that	  I	  employed	  a	  flawed	  definition	  of	  evolutionary	  traits,	  that	  40	   I	  framed	  my	  contribution	  within	  a	  flawed	  Price-­‐Hamilton	  tradition,	  and	  that	  I	  did	  41	   not	  correctly	  describe	  MLS	  in	  the	  context	  of	  class-­‐structured	  populations.	  	  42	   	  43	   Here,	  I:	  (1)	  reiterate	  the	  theoretical	  and	  conceptual	  nature	  of	  my	  synthesis;	  (2)	  44	   clarify	  that	  my	  genetical	  approach	  to	  traits	  is	  necessary	  for	  a	  proper	  analysis	  of	  45	   the	  action	  of	  MLS	  independently	  of	  non-­‐Darwinian	  factors;	  (3)	  emphasise	  that	  46	   the	  Price-­‐Hamilton	  approach	  to	  MLS	  is	  consistent,	  useful	  and	  conceptually	  47	   superior;	  and	  (4)	  explain	  the	  role	  of	  reproductive	  value	  in	  the	  study	  of	  natural	  48	   selection	  in	  class-­‐structured	  populations.	  	  49	   	  50	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Evidences	  of	  multilevel	  selection	  51	   	  52	   Goodnight	  suggests	  that	  I	  did	  not	  adequately	  review	  the	  empirical	  literature	  on	  53	   MLS,	  and	  he	  provides	  a	  brief	  overview	  to	  remedy	  this	  perceived	  oversight.	  54	   However,	  the	  empirical	  reality	  of	  various	  evolutionary	  phenomena	  that	  55	   researchers	  have	  referred	  to	  as	  MLS	  is	  not	  in	  dispute	  here.	  The	  real	  issue	  is	  that	  56	   MLS	  researchers	  have	  been	  unable	  to	  agree	  upon	  exactly	  what	  MLS	  and	  its	  57	   associated	  concepts	  actually	  mean,	  and	  it	  is	  this	  issue	  that	  provided	  the	  58	   motivation	  for	  my	  theoretical	  and	  conceptual	  synthesis.	  I	  made	  this	  clear	  in	  the	  59	   opening	  sentences	  of	  the	  Abstract:	  60	   	  61	   	  62	   	  63	   	  64	   	  65	   	  66	   	  67	   	  68	   	  69	   	  70	   	  71	  
Nevertheless,	  Goodnight’s	  empirical	  overview	  does	  helpfully	  illustrate	  the	  72	   muddle	  of	  definitions	  that	  are	  being	  used	  in	  the	  study	  of	  MLS.	  Importantly,	  whilst	  73	   many	  of	  the	  studies	  that	  he	  mentions	  define	  group	  selection	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  74	  
	  The	  theory	  of	  multilevel	  selection	  (MLS)	  is	  beset	  with	  conceptual	  difficulties.	  Although	  it	  is	  widely	  agreed	  that	  covariance	  between	  group	  trait	  and	  group	  fitness	  may	  arise	  in	  the	  natural	  world	  and	  drive	  a	  response	  to	  ‘group	  selection’,	  ambiguity	  exists	  over	  the	  precise	  meaning	  of	  group	  trait	  and	  group	  fitness	  and	  as	  to	  whether	  group	  selection	  should	  be	  defined	  according	  to	  changes	  in	  frequencies	  of	  different	  types	  of	  individual	  or	  different	  types	  of	  group.	   	  
	   4	  
proliferation	  and/or	  extinction	  of	  groups	  (e.g.	  Pruitt	  &	  Goodnight	  2014),	  others	  75	   define	  group	  selection	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  impact	  that	  an	  individual’s	  group	  76	   environment	  has	  on	  her	  own	  fitness	  (e.g.	  Stevens	  et	  al	  1995).	  These	  definitions	  77	   are	  not	  equivalent,	  and	  will	  often	  disagree	  with	  each	  other	  as	  to	  the	  existence,	  78	   magnitude	  and	  direction	  of	  group	  selection	  in	  particular	  scenarios	  (more	  on	  this,	  79	   below).	  	  80	   	  81	   I	  do	  disagree	  with	  Goodnight	  when	  he	  suggests	  that	  these	  empirical	  studies	  have	  82	   vindicated	  the	  “old”	  group	  selectionism	  of	  Wynne-­‐Edwards	  (1962).	  It	  is	  true	  that	  83	   artificially-­‐imposed,	  industrial	  batch-­‐level	  selection	  in	  chickens	  may	  lead	  to	  84	   increases	  in	  yield	  (Muir	  1996),	  but	  this	  is	  a	  world	  away	  from	  Wynne-­‐Edwards’	  85	   claim	  that	  whenever	  selection	  acting	  within	  wild	  populations	  is	  in	  opposition	  to	  86	   selection	  acting	  at	  the	  between-­‐population	  level,	  it	  is	  the	  latter	  that	  must	  prevail,	  87	   such	  that	  adaptation	  in	  the	  natural	  world	  is	  always	  “for	  the	  good	  of	  the	  group”.	  88	   Both	  of	  these	  points	  serve	  to	  illustrate	  the	  conceptual	  confusions	  that	  abound	  in	  89	   the	  MLS	  literature.	  90	   	  91	  
Multilevel	  selection	  is	  not	  evolution	  92	   	  93	   Goodnight	  suggests	  that	  my	  theoretical	  synthesis	  is	  flawed	  on	  account	  of	  my	  94	   conception	  of	  evolutionary	  traits	  being	  defined	  only	  for	  well-­‐mixed	  populations.	  95	   This	  is	  incorrect.	  The	  definition	  that	  I	  used	  is	  valid,	  conventional	  and	  appropriate	  96	   to	  the	  aims	  of	  my	  study.	  My	  impression	  is	  that	  confusion	  has	  arisen	  out	  of	  MLS	  97	   being	  conflated	  with	  total	  evolutionary	  change.	  98	   	  99	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Here	  is	  how	  I	  introduced	  the	  genetical	  approach	  to	  traits:	  100	   	  101	   	  102	   	  103	   	  104	   	  105	   	  106	   	  107	   	  108	   This	  linear-­‐regression	  approach	  to	  describing	  the	  genetical	  component	  of	  the	  109	   phenotype	  was	  introduced	  by	  Fisher	  (1918)	  and	  it	  is	  conventionally	  termed	  110	   “breeding	  value”	  (Falconer	  1981).	  The	  application	  of	  breeding	  values	  within	  the	  111	   context	  of	  Price’s	  equation	  was	  spelled	  out	  by	  Price	  (1970),	  and	  they	  are	  clearly	  112	   defined	  even	  for	  populations	  that	  are	  not	  well	  mixed	  (Falconer	  1985).	  Indeed,	  it	  113	   is	  the	  variance	  in	  breeding	  value	  that	  actually	  defines	  the	  “additive	  genetic	  114	   variance”	  (Falconer	  1985)	  that	  is	  central	  to	  Goodnight’s	  own	  approach	  to	  MLS	  in	  115	   structured	  populations	  (see	  below).	  If	  breeding	  value	  were	  really	  undefined	  116	   except	  for	  in	  well-­‐mixed	  populations,	  then	  the	  same	  would	  be	  true	  of	  additive	  117	   genetic	  variance.	  	  118	   	  119	   Goodnight’s	  concern	  with	  the	  breeding-­‐value	  approach	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  the	  120	   regression	  terms	  depend	  upon	  context.	  A	  gene’s	  average	  effect	  with	  regards	  to	  a	  121	   phenotype	  of	  interest	  may	  depend	  on	  its	  interactions	  with	  other	  genes	  and	  with	  122	   factors	  such	  as	  climate	  such	  that,	  in	  subsequent	  generations,	  when	  the	  gene	  may	  123	   find	  itself	  incorporated	  into	  different	  genotypes	  and	  experiencing	  different	  124	  
	  The	  character	  under	  selection	  is	  the	  heritable	  portion	  of	  the	  individual’s	  phenotypic	  trait,	  g;	  that	  is,	  a	  weighted	  sum	  of	  the	  frequencies	  of	  the	  alleles	  that	  the	  individual	  carries,	  the	  weights	  being	  decided	  by	  linear	  regression	  analysis…	  This	  quantity	  is	  also	  known	  as	  the	  individual’s	  ‘breeding	  value’	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climates,	  its	  average	  effect	  is	  liable	  to	  change.	  Consequently,	  the	  same	  genotype	  125	   is	  liable	  to	  have	  different	  breeding	  values	  in	  different	  generations.	  	  126	   	  127	   It	  is	  true	  that	  such	  changes	  in	  breeding	  value	  are	  not	  explicitly	  represented	  in	  my	  128	   equations.	  However,	  they	  are	  allowed	  for,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  equations	  remain	  129	   valid	  irrespective	  of	  such	  changes	  occurring.	  The	  reason	  that	  they	  do	  not	  feature	  130	   in	  the	  equations	  is	  that	  my	  aim	  was	  to	  describe	  only	  the	  action	  of	  natural	  131	   selection,	  and	  these	  changes	  in	  breeding	  value	  are	  not	  part	  of	  natural	  selection,	  132	   but	  instead	  represent	  a	  distinctly	  non-­‐Darwinian	  factor	  in	  evolution.	  In	  the	  133	   context	  of	  Price’s	  (1970,	  1972a)	  theorem,	  such	  changes	  accrue	  to	  the	  134	   “transmission”	  term.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  Fisher’s	  fundamental	  theorem,	  such	  135	   changes	  contribute	  to	  the	  “deterioration	  of	  the	  environment”	  (Fisher	  1930,	  1941;	  136	   Price	  1972b).	  I	  discussed	  both	  transmission	  and	  environmental	  deterioration	  as	  137	   part	  of	  the	  explication	  of	  my	  theoretical	  synthesis,	  making	  clear	  that	  these	  are	  138	   conceptually	  distinct	  from	  the	  action	  of	  MLS.	  139	   	  140	   The	  careful	  separation	  of	  selection	  and	  transmission	  effects	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  141	   matter	  of	  convention,	  but	  actually	  necessary	  from	  an	  adaptationist	  standpoint.	  It	  142	   is	  only	  natural	  selection,	  and	  not	  transmission	  factors	  –	  such	  as	  spontaneous,	  143	   random	  mutation	  and	  fluctuating	  average	  effects	  –	  that	  gives	  rise	  to	  adaptive	  144	   design	  (e.g.	  Gardner	  2009;	  Gardner	  &	  Welch	  2011).	  It	  is	  this	  unique	  role	  of	  145	   natural	  selection	  that	  motivated	  the	  focus	  of	  Fisher’s	  (1930)	  The	  genetical	  theory	  146	  
of	  natural	  selection,	  and	  his	  opening	  sentence:	  “Natural	  Selection	  is	  not	  147	   Evolution”.	  Fisher’s	  fundamental	  contributions	  to	  Darwinian	  theory,	  and	  the	  148	   contributions	  of	  others	  who	  have	  worked	  within	  his	  genetical	  framework,	  will	  149	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continue	  to	  be	  misunderstood	  for	  as	  long	  as	  the	  concepts	  of	  natural	  selection	  and	  150	   evolution	  are	  conflated.	  151	   	  152	  
Multilevel	  selection	  and	  covariance	  153	   	  154	   Goodnight	  suggests	  my	  theoretical	  synthesis	  is	  also	  flawed	  on	  account	  of	  it	  being	  155	   framed	  within	  the	  Price-­‐Hamilton	  approach	  to	  MLS	  (Price	  1972a;	  Hamilton	  156	   1975).	  In	  particular,	  he	  points	  out	  that	  the	  Price-­‐Hamilton	  formalism	  may	  detect	  157	   the	  operation	  of	  group	  selection	  even	  for	  nonsocial	  behaviours,	  and	  he	  suggests	  158	   that	  an	  alternative,	  contextual-­‐analysis	  approach	  provides	  the	  correct	  means	  of	  159	   capturing	  the	  action	  of	  MLS.	  I	  believe	  that	  both	  the	  Price-­‐Hamilton	  and	  160	   contextual-­‐analysis	  approaches	  yield	  useful	  insights,	  but	  that	  it	  is	  the	  former	  161	   rather	  than	  the	  latter	  that	  properly	  engages	  with	  the	  ideas	  of	  selection	  and	  162	   adaptation	  at	  the	  group	  level.	  Moreover,	  I	  believe	  it	  is	  desirable	  –	  rather	  than	  163	   problematic	  –	  that	  the	  Price-­‐Hamilton	  approach	  is	  able	  to	  diagnose	  the	  operation	  164	   of	  group	  selection	  beyond	  the	  realm	  of	  social	  behaviour.	  165	   	  166	   Price’s	  (1970,	  1972a)	  selection-­‐covariance	  theorem	  provides	  a	  very	  general	  167	   framework	  for	  thinking	  about	  selection	  in	  any	  context	  and	  in	  any	  medium.	  In	  the	  168	   context	  of	  evolutionary	  biology,	  it	  defines	  the	  action	  of	  natural	  selection	  in	  terms	  169	   of	  a	  partial	  change	  in	  the	  average	  value	  of	  a	  genetical	  trait,	  and	  it	  reveals	  that	  this	  170	   change	  is	  equal	  to	  the	  covariance,	  taken	  across	  all	  the	  individuals	  in	  the	  171	   population,	  between	  the	  individual’s	  genetical	  trait	  and	  her	  relative	  fitness.	  It	  is	  172	   intuitive,	  then,	  that	  group	  selection	  should	  be	  defined	  analogously,	  as	  the	  173	   covariance,	  taken	  across	  all	  the	  groups	  in	  the	  population,	  between	  the	  group’s	  174	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genetical	  trait	  and	  the	  group’s	  fitness.	  This	  is	  exactly	  the	  Price-­‐Hamilton	  175	   approach	  to	  MLS.	  This	  approach	  conceives	  of	  the	  group	  itself	  as	  the	  unit	  of	  group	  176	   selection,	  it	  assigns	  the	  group	  its	  own	  fitness,	  and	  it	  views	  group	  selection	  as	  177	   being	  driven	  by	  the	  differential	  fitness	  of	  groups	  per	  se.	  Importantly,	  by	  focusing	  178	   on	  the	  group’s	  fitness,	  it	  directly	  connects	  with	  ideas	  of	  adaptation	  “for	  the	  good	  179	   of	  the	  group”.	  	  180	   	  181	   In	  contrast,	  whilst	  contextual	  analysis	  is	  also	  rooted	  in	  Price’s	  covariance	  182	   definition	  of	  natural	  selection,	  it	  instead	  conceives	  of	  group	  selection	  in	  terms	  of	  183	   the	  impact	  that	  the	  individual’s	  social	  environment	  has	  on	  that	  individual’s	  184	   fitness.	  Accordingly,	  it	  conceptualises	  the	  individual	  as	  the	  unit	  of	  group	  185	   selection,	  and	  it	  views	  group	  selection	  as	  being	  driven	  by	  the	  differential	  fitness	  186	   of	  individuals	  per	  se,	  rather	  than	  the	  differential	  fitness	  of	  groups.	  This	  is	  how	  187	   contextual	  analysis	  is	  able	  to	  diagnose	  the	  action	  of	  group	  selection	  in	  the	  context	  188	   of	  soft	  selection,	  e.g.	  despite	  all	  groups	  having	  equal	  fitness.	  Put	  another	  way:	  189	   whereas	  the	  Price-­‐Hamilton	  approach	  isolates	  the	  part	  of	  natural	  selection	  that	  190	   corresponds	  with	  the	  adaptation	  of	  groups,	  contextual	  analysis	  isolates	  the	  part	  191	   of	  natural	  selection	  that	  corresponds	  with	  the	  adaptation	  of	  individuals	  to	  their	  192	   particular	  group	  contexts.	  Both	  are	  useful	  approaches	  for	  studying	  selection	  but,	  193	   I’d	  argue,	  only	  one	  is	  properly	  engaging	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  group	  selection.	  194	   	  195	   It	  is	  true	  that	  the	  Price-­‐Hamilton	  approach	  may	  diagnose	  the	  operation	  of	  group	  196	   selection	  in	  some	  scenarios	  that	  do	  not	  involve	  social	  behaviour.	  For	  example,	  if	  197	   some	  individuals	  have	  better	  eyesight,	  and	  if	  some	  groups	  –	  by	  chance	  –	  have	  198	   more	  better-­‐sighted	  individuals	  than	  others,	  then	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  action	  of	  199	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natural	  selection	  for	  improved	  eyesight	  will	  occur	  at	  the	  between-­‐group	  level.	  200	   However,	  although	  this	  point	  has	  been	  much	  discussed	  in	  the	  literature	  for	  the	  201	   last	  ~30	  years,	  there	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  any	  consensus	  on	  whether	  it	  is	  202	   actually	  fatal	  to	  the	  Price-­‐Hamilton	  approach.	  	  203	   	  204	   My	  own	  view	  is	  that,	  far	  from	  being	  fatal,	  this	  diagnosis	  of	  group	  selection	  205	   beyond	  the	  realm	  of	  social	  behaviour	  is	  actually	  desirable	  (Gardner	  &	  Grafen	  206	   2009).	  The	  MLS	  partition	  of	  natural	  selection	  into	  its	  within-­‐group	  and	  between-­‐207	   group	  components	  is	  not	  supposed	  to	  delineate	  the	  boundary	  between	  the	  social	  208	   and	  nonsocial	  realms:	  that	  is	  the	  job	  of	  the	  kin-­‐selection	  partition	  of	  natural	  209	   selection	  into	  its	  direct-­‐fitness	  and	  indirect-­‐fitness	  effects	  (Gardner	  et	  al	  2011).	  210	   Moreover,	  it	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  view	  within-­‐group	  selection	  as	  the	  sole	  driver	  211	   of	  individual-­‐level	  adaptations,	  including	  good	  eyesight:	  rather,	  the	  it	  is	  the	  total	  212	   action	  of	  natural	  selection,	  acting	  both	  within	  and	  between	  groups,	  that	  leads	  213	   individuals	  to	  become	  adapted	  to	  maximize	  their	  inclusive	  fitness	  (Gardner	  &	  214	   Grafen	  2009).	  Instead,	  the	  conceptual	  significance	  of	  the	  MLS	  partition	  is	  that	  it	  215	   separates	  natural	  selection	  into	  the	  component	  that	  is	  responsible	  for	  group-­‐216	   level	  adaptation	  (i.e.	  between-­‐group	  selection)	  and	  the	  component	  that	  acts	  to	  217	   undermine	  the	  adaptive	  integrity	  of	  groups	  (i.e.	  within-­‐group	  selection;	  Gardner	  218	   &	  Grafen	  2009).	  	  219	   	  220	   If	  natural	  selection	  is	  acting	  –	  wholly	  or	  in	  part	  –	  at	  the	  within-­‐group	  level,	  then	  221	   traits	  will	  not	  be	  favoured	  to	  maximize	  group	  fitness	  and	  any	  adaptive	  rationale	  222	   will	  need	  to	  be	  sought	  at	  a	  lower	  level.	  But	  if	  natural	  selection	  is	  acting	  only	  at	  223	   the	  between-­‐group	  level	  –	  e.g.,	  if	  groupmates	  are	  genetically-­‐identical	  clones	  –	  224	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then	  adaptations	  will	  evolve	  for	  the	  good	  of	  the	  group	  (Gardner	  &	  Grafen	  2009).	  225	   Note	  that,	  in	  scenarios	  permitting	  a	  group-­‐adaptationist	  interpretation,	  one	  is	  226	   free	  to	  interpret	  good	  eyesight	  either	  as	  an	  individual-­‐level	  adaptation	  for	  227	   maximizing	  the	  individual’s	  inclusive	  fitness	  or	  a	  group-­‐level	  adaptation	  for	  228	   maximizing	  the	  group’s	  inclusive	  fitness.	  This	  is	  analogous	  to	  how	  one	  can	  view	  a	  229	   macrophage	  engulfing	  an	  bacterium	  as	  either	  a	  cell	  maximizing	  its	  own	  inclusive	  230	   fitness	  or	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  suite	  of	  adaptations	  employed	  by	  a	  multicellular	  animal	  231	   for	  maximizing	  her	  inclusive	  fitness	  (Gardner	  2014).	  Adaptationism	  is	  a	  scientific	  232	   tool	  that	  uses	  optimization	  thinking	  to	  formulate	  testable	  predictions	  (Parker	  &	  233	   Maynard	  Smith	  1990)	  and,	  if	  the	  interests	  of	  individual	  and	  group	  are	  aligned,	  234	   then	  it	  is	  empirically	  vacuous	  to	  debate	  whether	  it	  is	  the	  individual	  or	  the	  group	  235	   that	  has	  been	  optimized.	  	  236	   	  237	  
Multilevel	  selection	  in	  class-­‐structured	  populations	  238	   	  239	   Turning	  to	  the	  specific	  issue	  of	  class	  structure,	  Goodnight	  suggests	  my	  approach	  240	   to	  MLS	  in	  this	  context	  is	  flawed	  on	  both	  conceptual	  and	  technical	  grounds.	  In	  241	   particular,	  he	  suggests	  that	  I	  have	  erroneously	  assigned	  fitness	  to	  only	  one	  level	  242	   of	  biological	  organization	  –	  the	  individual	  –	  and	  he	  provides	  a	  contextual-­‐243	   analysis	  treatment	  of	  MLS	  in	  parasitoid	  wasps	  that	  he	  claims	  is	  superior	  to	  my	  244	   Price-­‐Hamilton	  approach.	  Here,	  I	  suggest	  there	  there	  has	  been	  a	  245	   misunderstanding	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  reproductive	  value	  and	  its	  role	  in	  theory	  of	  246	   natural	  selection,	  and	  I	  show	  that	  the	  contextual-­‐analysis	  treatment	  is	  247	   mathematically,	  biologically	  and	  conceptually	  invalid	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  248	   Price-­‐Hamilton	  approach.	  249	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  250	   The	  concept	  of	  reproductive	  value	  is	  of	  crucial	  importance	  in	  the	  context	  of	  class-­‐251	   structured	  populations.	  If	  individuals	  differ	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  not	  strictly	  genetical,	  252	   then	  they	  cannot	  be	  considered	  equivalent	  from	  a	  natural-­‐selection	  perspective,	  253	   and	  must	  be	  subdivided	  into	  separate	  classes.	  One	  aspect	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  class	  254	   structure	  is	  that	  not	  all	  offspring	  are	  equal,	  such	  that	  a	  simple	  count	  of	  offspring	  255	   number	  may	  not	  provide	  an	  adequate	  measure	  of	  an	  individual’s	  Darwinian	  256	   success.	  A	  vivid	  example	  is	  provided	  by	  sex	  allocation,	  in	  which	  parents	  decide	  257	   the	  sex,	  rather	  than	  the	  number,	  of	  their	  offspring	  (Darwin	  1871;	  Fisher	  1930).	  258	   Accordingly,	  a	  proper	  measure	  of	  Darwinian	  success	  is	  provided	  by	  the	  259	   individual’s	  reproductive	  value,	  i.e.	  her	  expected,	  asymptotic,	  relative	  260	   contribution	  of	  genes	  to	  future	  generations,	  and	  each	  class	  of	  individual	  261	   contributes	  to	  the	  overall	  action	  of	  natural	  selection	  in	  proportion	  to	  its	  262	   reproductive	  value	  (Fisher	  1930).	  Taylor	  (1996)	  provides	  an	  introductory-­‐level	  263	   overview	  of	  the	  mathematics	  of	  reproductive	  value.	  264	   	  265	   As	  an	  illustrative	  application	  of	  my	  theoretical	  and	  conceptual	  synthesis,	  I	  266	   discussed	  the	  relationship	  between	  non-­‐transmissible	  cancer	  and	  MLS.	  Although	  267	   cancer	  has	  often	  been	  conceptualized	  as	  involving	  a	  tension	  between	  different	  268	   levels	  of	  selection	  –	  i.e.	  favoured	  at	  a	  within-­‐individual	  level	  and	  disfavoured	  at	  a	  269	   between-­‐individual	  level	  –	  I	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  proliferation	  of	  cancer	  cells	  270	   cannot	  be	  conceptualized	  in	  terms	  of	  MLS,	  in	  the	  strict	  sense	  of	  the	  genetical	  271	   theory,	  because	  cancer	  cells	  –	  and	  somatic	  cells	  in	  general	  –	  have	  no	  272	   reproductive	  value.	  But	  Goodnight	  suggests	  that	  my	  logic	  is	  faulty:	  he	  argues	  that	  273	   since	  cancerous	  cells	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  proliferate	  and	  exhibit	  heredity,	  their	  274	  
	   12	  
proliferation	  does	  represent	  within-­‐individual	  selection,	  and	  that	  my	  conclusion	  275	   had	  stemmed	  from	  me	  assigning	  fitness	  only	  at	  the	  level	  of	  individual	  organisms.	  	  276	   	  277	   However,	  this	  is	  incorrect:	  I	  did	  not	  assign	  zero	  reproductive	  value	  to	  cancer	  cells	  278	   because	  they	  are	  cells	  and	  not	  individuals,	  but	  rather	  because	  they	  are	  cells	  279	   whose	  lineages	  perish	  with	  the	  death	  of	  the	  individual	  organism,	  such	  that	  their	  280	   expected,	  asymptotic,	  relative	  contribution	  of	  genes	  to	  future	  generation	  is	  zero.	  281	   Even	  if	  reproductive	  value	  is	  assigned	  only	  to	  cells	  and	  not	  to	  whole	  organisms,	  282	   all	  of	  the	  reproductive	  value	  in	  the	  population	  belongs	  to	  germline	  cells	  whilst	  283	   somatic	  cells	  have	  zero	  reproductive	  value.	  Thus,	  according	  to	  Fisher’s	  284	   proportionality	  principle,	  the	  proliferation	  of	  cancerous	  cells	  within	  somatic	  285	   tissues	  cannot	  be	  part	  of	  MLS,	  in	  the	  strict	  sense	  of	  the	  genetical	  theory	  –	  though	  286	   it	  may	  induce	  differential	  reproductive	  value	  of	  germline	  cells,	  at	  a	  between-­‐287	   organism	  level,	  selectively	  favouring	  the	  evolution	  of	  anti-­‐cancer	  adaptations.	  288	   	  289	   The	  role	  of	  reproductive	  value	  in	  modulating	  a	  class’s	  contribution	  to	  the	  overall	  290	   action	  of	  natural	  selection	  is	  captured	  mathematically	  by	  Price’s	  (1970)	  equation	  291	   for	  class-­‐structured	  populations	  –	  specifically,	  Price’s	  equation	  (5)	  and	  my	  292	   equation	  (4).	  This	  describes	  a	  separate	  selection	  covariance	  for	  each	  class	  in	  the	  293	   population,	  and	  adds	  them	  together	  to	  yield	  the	  total	  action	  of	  natural	  selection,	  294	   with	  each	  class’s	  contribution	  being	  weighted	  by	  its	  reproductive	  value	  (such	  295	   that	  a	  class	  with	  no	  reproductive	  value	  makes	  no	  contribution	  at	  all).	  As	  part	  of	  296	   my	  theoretical	  synthesis,	  I	  combined	  this	  equation	  with	  Price’s	  (1972a)	  equation	  297	   for	  MLS	  –	  specifically,	  Price’s	  equation	  (A17)	  and	  my	  equation	  (5).	  This	  provided	  298	   a	  statement	  of	  MLS	  for	  class-­‐structured	  populations	  –	  specifically,	  my	  equation	  299	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(7).	  This	  equation	  takes	  each	  class’s	  separate	  contribution	  to	  the	  total	  action	  of	  300	   natural	  selection,	  and	  separates	  its	  within-­‐group	  and	  between-­‐group	  301	   components,	  such	  that	  the	  total	  action	  of	  group	  selection	  is	  defined	  as	  a	  class-­‐302	   reproductive-­‐value-­‐weighted	  sum	  of	  the	  between-­‐group	  selection	  terms	  for	  each	  303	   class.	  304	   	  305	   In	  my	  study,	  I	  pointed	  out	  that	  this	  formulation	  presents	  some	  conceptual	  306	   problems	  for	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  social	  group	  as	  a	  unit	  of	  selection.	  In	  particular,	  307	   whilst	  in	  some	  scenarios	  the	  sum	  of	  between-­‐group-­‐selection	  terms	  can	  be	  308	   brought	  together	  as	  a	  single	  selection	  covariance,	  with	  the	  social	  group	  acting	  as	  309	   the	  unit	  of	  selection,	  more	  generally	  the	  social	  group	  remains	  fragmented	  into	  its	  310	   separate	  pure-­‐class	  subgroups,	  and	  it	  is	  these	  that	  are	  considered	  the	  units	  of	  311	   group	  selection,	  rather	  than	  the	  whole	  social	  group.	  To	  illustrate	  the	  problem,	  I	  312	   considered	  the	  following	  scenario:	  313	  
	  For	  example,	  a	  parasitoid	  wasp	  might	  oviposit	  a	  single	  unfertilized	  (i.e.	  male)	  egg	  and	  a	  single	  fertilized	  (i.e.	  female)	  egg	  into	  a	  caterpillar,	  within	  which	  these	  siblings	  develop	  and	  compete	  for	  resources,	  and	  this	  yields	  both	  a	  clearly	  defined	  social	  group	  of	  more	  than	  one	  individual	  and	  also	  ample	  scope	  for	  kin	  selection.	  Yet,	  it	  is	  unclear	  whether	  group	  selection	  can	  occur,	  except	  in	  the	  trivial	  sense	  that	  a	  single	  individual	  can	  be	  considered	  a	  group	  of	  size	  1,	  owing	  to	  difficulties	  in	  bringing	  the	  separate	  selection	  covariances	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  314	   	  315	   	  316	   Goodnight	  suggests	  that	  this	  Price-­‐Hamilton	  approach	  is	  simply	  flawed,	  and	  317	   instead	  provides	  a	  treatment	  of	  the	  parasitoid	  wasp	  scenario	  using	  his	  preferred	  318	   contextual-­‐analysis	  approach.	  He	  states	  that	  the	  response	  to	  selection	  for	  319	   arbitrary	  individual-­‐level	  and	  group-­‐level	  traits	  is	  given	  by	  R	  =	  ½	  (G	  PF-­‐1	  SF	  +	  G	  320	  
PM-­‐1	  SM),	  where:	  PF	  and	  PM	  are	  3×3	  phenotypic	  covariance	  matrices	  describing	  321	   female,	  male	  and	  group	  traits	  in	  females	  and	  males,	  respectively;	  G	  is	  the	  322	   corresponding	  3×3	  genetic	  covariance	  matrix;	  and	  SF	  and	  SM	  are	  vectors	  of	  order	  323	   3	  describing	  the	  selection	  differentials	  in	  females	  and	  males,	  respectively.	  This	  is	  324	   a	  modified	  version	  of	  Lande’s	  (1980)	  classic	  result.	  325	   	  326	   However,	  this	  contextual-­‐analysis	  treatment	  is	  problematic	  in	  several	  respects.	  327	   Firstly,	  it	  is	  mathematically	  invalid	  because	  the	  phenotypic	  covariance	  matrices,	  328	   being	  singular,	  are	  uninvertable,	  so	  the	  right	  hand	  side	  of	  the	  equation	  is	  actually	  329	   undefined:	  this	  is	  the	  linear-­‐algebraic	  equivalent	  of	  a	  division-­‐by-­‐zero	  error.	  To	  330	   be	  clear,	  this	  error	  is	  present	  only	  in	  Goodnight’s	  treatment,	  and	  not	  in	  Lande’s	  331	   formulation.	  Secondly,	  the	  contextual-­‐analysis	  treatment	  is	  biologically	  invalid	  332	   because	  it	  assumes	  a	  diploid	  mode	  of	  inheritance,	  which	  is	  incompatible	  with	  the	  333	   haplodiploid	  mode	  of	  inheritance	  exhibited	  by	  parasitoid	  wasps	  (both	  in	  reality	  334	   and	  in	  the	  hypothetical	  scenario	  outlined	  above).	  Lande’s	  article	  does	  contain	  a	  335	   result	  for	  haplodiploidy,	  in	  the	  Appendix,	  that	  might	  serve	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  a	  re-­‐336	   worked	  contextual-­‐analysis	  treatment.	  Thirdly,	  the	  contextual-­‐analysis	  337	   treatment	  hinges	  upon	  particular,	  ad	  hoc	  assumptions	  –	  such	  as	  Gaussian	  338	  
for	  male	  subgroups	  and	  for	  female	  subgroups	  together	  into	  a	  single	  selection	  covariance.	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variance	  –	  that	  may	  yield	  a	  more	  or	  less	  reasonable	  approximation	  in	  the	  context	  339	   of	  particular	  applications,	  but	  which	  fundamentally	  limit	  its	  wider	  generality.	  340	   This	  contrasts	  with	  the	  Price-­‐Hamilton	  approach	  to	  MLS,	  which	  emerges	  from	  341	   purely	  notational	  definitions	  as	  an	  exact	  mathematical	  identity,	  and	  enjoys	  the	  342	   fullest	  generality	  of	  mathematical	  and	  empirical	  application.	  	  343	   	  344	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